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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Roberto Imenec was convicted of one count of conspiracy 
to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.S 846. 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania sentenced him to 151 months imprisonment, 
five years of supervised release, a $2000 fine, and a $50 
special assessment. Imenec asserts that the District Court 
erred when it imposed a two point upward departure for 
obstruction of justice, pursuant to Section 3C1.1 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines. We will affirm the sentence of the 
district court. 
 
I. 
 
Imenec was arrested after selling crack cocaine to 
undercover Philadelphia police officers on four separate 
occasions. He was charged with state drug offenses and 
released on bail with an order to appear in state court for 
a preliminary hearing on November 26, 1991. One day 
before the scheduled preliminary hearing, the United States 
Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
secured a warrant for Imenec's arrest on federal drug 
offenses based on the same events. Federal authorities 
intended to arrest Imenec when he appeared at the state 
court proceeding. Imenec did not appear at his preliminary 
hearing, however, and subsequent attempts to locate him 
proved fruitless. In October, 1992, a federal grand jury 
returned an indictment against Imenec. 
 
A few years later, on May 31, 1995, Imenec was arrested 
in New York under the alias, "Jose Estevez," and charged 
with conspiracy to distribute cocaine. An automated 
fingerprint check revealed Imenec's identity, and 
arrangements were made to have him brought to 
Pennsylvania to face the charges set forth in the 1992 
federal indictment. After challenging his prosecution as 
untimely under the Sixth Amendment, Imenec agreed to 
cooperate with authorities. He ultimately pled guilty to one 
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count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, acknowledging 
that the conspiracy involved 214.8 grams of crack cocaine. 
 
On September 14, 1998, the District Court sentenced 
Imenec to 151 months imprisonment, five years of 
supervised release, a $2000 fine, and a $50 special 
assessment. The District Court concluded that Imenec had 
obstructed justice when he failed to appear at the state 
court preliminary hearing in 1991, and based on that 
finding, imposed a two point upward enhancement, 
pursuant to Sentencing Guideline S 3C1.1. The sole issue 
raised in this appeal is whether the imposition of the 
upward enhancement was based on an erroneous 
construction of S 3C1.1. 
 
II. 
 
Because Imenec was sentenced in 1997, we must analyze 
his appeal under the Guidelines as they existed at that 
time. The relevant version of S 3C1.1 provides that "[i]f the 
defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to 
obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the 
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant 
offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels." U.S.S.G. 
S 3C1.1 (Nov. 1997).1 The Application Notes offer us some 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In 1998, Section 3C1.1 was modified; it now provides: 
 
       If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted 
to 
       obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the course 
       of the investigation, prosecution or sentencing of the instant 
offense 
       of conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the 
       defendant's offense of conviction and any related conduct; or (ii) 
a 
       closely related offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 (Nov. 1998). The application notes indicate that the 
amendment was intended to address the issue raised in this appeal -- 
i.e., whether the term "instant offense" applies to obstructions that 
occur 
in cases closely related to the defendant's case or only to those 
obstructions specifically related to the offense for which the defendant 
has been convicted. "The amendment, which adopts the majority view, 
instructs that the obstruction must relate either to the defendant's 
offense of conviction (including any relevant conduct) or to a closely 
related case." U.S.S.G. App. C at 583. It, thus, appears that Imenec's 
conduct would merit enhancement under the 1998 Guidelines. 
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guidance in determining what type of conduct constitutes 
obstruction of justice for the purposes of S 3C1.1. Two of 
the enumerated examples are of particular significance. 
Note Three establishes that "willfully failing to appear, as 
ordered, for a judicial proceeding" is an obstruction of 
justice under S 3C1.1, and Note Four provides that 
"avoiding or fleeing from arrest" does not constitute 
obstruction of justice. 
 
The District Court accepted the Government's position 
that Imenec's failure to appear at his preliminary hearing in 
Pennsylvania state court in 1991 was a willful failure to 
appear at a judicial proceeding, justifying the upward 
departure pursuant to Application Note Three of S 3C1.1. 
Imenec concedes that he failed to appear at a state judicial 
proceeding, but he argues that, because it was a state, 
rather than a federal, court, his failure to appear was 
outside the ambit of S 3C1.1. The only "effect" his action 
had upon federal proceedings, he argues, was to avoid or 
delay his arrest, an action that Application Note Four of 
S 3C1.1 clearly excludes. The District Court was 
unpersuaded by Imenec's proposed construction ofS 3C1.1. 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court's 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United 
States v. Powell, 113 F.3d 464, 467 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
III. 
 
The answer to whether a S 3C1.1 obstruction of justice 
enhancement is appropriate in this case depends on 
whether "instant offense" is understood to refer to the 
criminal conduct underlying the specific offense of 
conviction, as the government contends, or is read to be 
limited to the specific offense of conviction itself, as Imenec 
insists. Based on the text and purpose of S 3C1.1, we 
conclude that the Sentencing Commission's intent was to 
impose an enhancement for any conduct that obstructs an 
investigation, prosecution or sentencing proceeding that is 
based on the criminal conduct underlying the specific 
statutory offense for which the defendant is being 
sentenced. 
 
Section 3C1.1 imposes a sanction for conduct that 
obstructs an official criminal investigation, even though the 
 
                                4 
  
investigation has not yet matured into a prosecution and, 
indeed, even though no thought has yet been given to what 
the appropriate criminal charge might be. As a result, we 
believe it unlikely that the Sentencing Commission intended 
to require a nexus between the specific statutory offense 
and the obstructed investigation beyond a showing that the 
conduct being investigated gave rise to the criminal charge 
ultimately decided upon. 
 
Moreover, we believe the intent reflected in the text of 
S 3C1.1 is the one most consistent with its purpose. As the 
Court of Appeals put it in United States v. Emery, 991 F.2d 
907 (1st Cir. 1993): 
 
       [T]he obstruction-of-justice enhancement rests on the 
       rationale that "a defendant who commits a crime and 
       then . . . [makes] an unlawful attempt to avoid 
       responsibility is more threatening to society and less 
       deserving of leniency than a defendant who does not so 
       defy" the criminal justice process. 
 
Id. at 912 (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 
97 (1993)). As the Emery court went on to point out, the 
threat that the defendant poses and his or her culpability 
with respect to the offense of conviction are not lessened by 
the happenstance that the obstructive conduct occurred at 
a time when state, rather than federal, authorities were 
conducting the investigation of the conduct underlying the 
offense of conviction. 
 
Because we interpret "the instant offense" in the manner 
suggested by the government, we conclude that aS 3C1.1 
enhancement is appropriate where the defendant has 
obstructed an investigation of the criminal conduct 
underlying the offense of conviction, even where the 
investigation was being conducted by state authorities at 
the time. Given that interpretation, we further conclude 
and hold that a S 3C1.1 enhancement is appropriate where 
the defendant has obstructed a prosecution based on the 
same criminal conduct underlying the offense of conviction 
even though that prosecution is going forward in a state 
court. 
 
Our holding is consistent with and supported by our 
existing circuit jurisprudence. In United States v. Powell, 
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113 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 1997), we construed S 3C1.1 as 
applying, not only to conduct obstructing the proceedings 
against the defendant himself, but also to conduct 
obstructing a separate trial of a co-defendant on a charge 
based on the same criminal conduct underlying the 
defendant's offense of conviction. In Powell, the defendant 
had been convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine with 
his brother. The defendant pled guilty to the conspiracy, 
but then, in an effort to impede his brother's prosecution, 
he testified falsely at his brother's trial. The District Court 
applied S 3C1.1 and imposed a two level enhancement on 
Powell. On appeal, Powell argued that S 3C1.1 was 
inapposite, because his conduct did not obstruct the 
"instant offense." We rejected that argument and held that 
S 3C1.1 "applies where a defendant attempts to obstruct 
justice in a case closely related to his own . . . ." Id. 
 
While Powell involved two federal prosecutions, its 
holding is inconsistent with an understanding that 
"prosecution" in S 3C1.1 is limited to the prosecution that 
produced the conviction for which the defendant is being 
sentenced. It is consistent with the notion thatS 3C1.1 
applies to conduct obstructing any investigation, 
prosecution or sentencing proceeding based on the same 
criminal conduct that underlies the offense for which the 
defendant is being sentenced. Indeed, it seems to us that 
this case follows a fortiori from Powell, since Imenec, in 
obstructing the state prosecution, was attempting, unlike 
Powell, to avoid accountability for his own criminal 
conduct. 
 
Cases from other Courts of Appeals also provide support 
for our holding. See United States v. Smart, 41 F.3d 263, 
265-66 (6th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (argument that failure 
to appear at state court proceeding was unrelated to the 
"instant" case "is simply not tenable"); United States v. 
Adediran, 26 F.3d 61, 65 (8th Cir. 1994) ("this circuit does 
not prohibit obstruction enhancement in federal 
prosecutions merely because state entities were involved"). 
In addition, other Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
expansively interpreted S 3C1.1 to require enhancement for 
conduct obstructing state investigations, even when the 
obstructive conduct occurred before federal charges were 
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filed or a federal investigation was even initiated. See United 
States v. Self, 132 F.3d 1039, 1042 (4th Cir. 1997) 
("[s]ection 3C1.1 draws no distinction between a federal 
investigation and a state investigation"); United States v. 
Emery, 991 F.2d 907, 911-12 (1st Cir. 1993) ("so long as 
some official investigation is underway at the time of the 
obstructive conduct, the absence of a federal investigation 
is not an absolute bar to the imposition of a section 3C1.1 
enhancement"); United States v. Lato, 934 F.2d 1080, 1083 
(9th Cir. 1991) (obstruction of a state investigation properly 
considered for purposes of a 3C1.1 enhancement). 
 
IV. 
 
In conclusion, we hold that S 3C1.1 requires a two level 
enhancement when a defendant fails to appear at a judicial 
proceeding, state or federal, relating to the conduct 
underlying the federal criminal charge. Accordingly, the 
judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
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